Introduction
Given the causal and temporal relations between events in a knowledge base, what are the ways they can be described in text?
Elsewhere, we have argued that during interpretation, the reader-hearer H must iufer certain tempe, ra[ information from knowledge about the world, language use and prugmatics. It is generally agreed that processes of Gricean implicature help determine the interpretation of text in context. But without a notion of logical consequo_nce to underwrite them, the infercnccs~ftcn defea~sib]e in nature will appear arbitrary, and unprincipled, llence, we have explored the requirements on a formal model of temporal implicature, and outlined one possible nonmonotouic framework for discourse interpretation (La.scarides & Asher [1991] , Lascarides & Oberlander [1992a] ).
ttere, we argue that if the writer-sllcakcr S is to tailor text to H, then discourse generation can be informed by a similar formal model of implicaturc. We suggest two ways to do it: a version of [[obbs et al's [1988, 1990] Generation as Abduction; and the Interactive Defaults strategy introduced by aoshi et al [1984a, 1984b, 1986] . In investigating the latter strategy, the basic goal is to determine how notions of temporal reliability, precision and coherence call be used by a nonmonotonic logic to constrain the space of possible utterances. We explore a defea.sible reasoning framework in which the interactions between the relative knowledge bases of S and H helps do this. Finally, we briefly discuss limitations of the strategy: in particular, its apparent marginalisation of discourse structure.
The paper focuses very specitically on implicatures of a temporal nature. ~lb examine tile relevant exampies in sufficient detail, we have had to exclude discussion of many closely related issues in the theory of discourse structure, rib motivate tbis restriction, let us therefore consider first why we might want to generate discourses with structures which lead to temporal complexities. *The ~uthors gratefully acknowledge the support of the Science and Engineering Research Council through project number on/G22077, tIORO is supported by the Economic and Social Research Council. We thank our anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments. Email contact: jonQcogaci.ed, ac.uk
Getting
Things Out of Order Consider tile following suggestion for generating tex: tuul descril)tions of causal-temporal structures, I)escribe things in exactly the order in which they happened. If textual order is maAe to match eventual order, then perhaps little can go wrong; for the bearer can safely a.ssume that all the texts she bears are narrative. Under these circumstances, the problem of selecting adequate regions in the space of utterances pretty much (lis~solw~s. We do not believe that this suggestion will work, in general, and consider here two 0.rgunlelltS against it.
Hovy's argument Basically, the generation strategy snggested above fails to emphasise the force of some eventualities over others (cf. the nncleus-satellite distinction in RST). A useful device for emphasis is the topic-couuuent structure: we mention the important event first, and then the others, which till out or give further detail about that important event. These 'comments' on the 'topic' may be elfects, but they could also bc the cause of the topic. If the latter, then textual order and temporal order mismatch; the text is a cmlsal explanation in such cases, and having only narrativc discourse structure available would preclude its gen--era, ion. Compare (1) and (2), modified from Ilovy [199o] .
(1) First, Jim bumped Mike once and hurt him.
Then they fought. Eventually, Mike stabbed him. As a result, aim died.
(2) aim died in a fight with Mike. After Jim Inunped
Mike once, they fought, and eventually Mike stabbed him. The textual order in (1) matches temporal order, whereas ill (2) there is mismatctL And yet (2) is nmch better than (1). This is bccause the 'important' event is Jim's death. Everything mentioned in (1) leads up to this. But because, the events are mentioned in their temporal order, the text obscures the fact that all the events led to Jim's death, even though syntactic markers like and then and as a resuR are used.
The causal groupings are clearer in (2) because it's clear during incremental processing that the text following tile mention of Jim's death is a description of how it came about. This is so even thougtl ,to syntactic markers indicate this causal structure. By contrast, in (1) the reader realises what's going on only at tile last sentence. The discourse structure is therefore unclear until the whole text is heard, for the narrative requires a common topic which is only stated at the end.
So (2)'s a better discourse than (1); but we would never generate it, if textual order had to mirror eventual order. If a generation system were permitted to generate (2), however, a price must be paid. The proper interpretation of (2) relies on the recruitment of certain causal information, left implicit by the utterance. The generator thus bas some responsibility for ensuring that the interpreter accomplishes the required inferences. A formal model of impticature must be folded into the generation process, so that the appropriate reasoning can proceed.
States |nteract with causal information
Ill La.scarides and Oberlander [1992] , we considered in detail the following pair of examples:
(3) Max opened the door. The room was pitch dark.
(4) Max switched off the light. The room was pitch dark.
Now, no-one would want to say that (3) involved a room becoming pitch dark immediately after a door was opened. Rather, most accounts (such as those based in or around DRT, such as ttinrichs [1986] ) will take the state of darkness to overlap tile event of door-opening. That's how one might say states are dealt with in a narrative: events move things along;
states leave them where they are. But if we have a piece of causal information to hand, things axe rather different. In (4), it seems that the state doesn't overlap the previously mentioned event.
If one wishes to preserve the assumption about the role of states in narrative, it would have to be weakened to the constraint that states either leave things where they are, or move them along. This is not a very convincing move. An alternative is to formalise the role of the additional causal knowledge. Informally, the basis for the distinct interpretations of (3) and (4) is that the interpretation of (4) is informed by a causal preference which is lacking in the case of (3): if there is a switching off of the light and a room's being dark that are connected by a causal, part/whole or overlap relation, then normally one infers that the former caused the latter. This knowledge is defeasible, of course. In generation, such knowledge will constrain the space of adequate utterances; if H lacks the defeasible causal knowledge that switching off lights cause darkness, then (4) won't be adequate for H, who will interpret (4) in the same way as (3), contrary to S's intentions. Given this, S must contain a defeasible reasoning component to compute over such knowledge.
The important point for now is that even if we describe things in the order in which they are assumed to happen, this doesn't necessarily make the candidate utterance a good one. if the speaker and the hearer possess differing world knowledge, there may be problems in retrieving the correct causal-temporal structure. 
Generation by Defeasible Reasoning
There is a very general way in which we might view interpretation and generation in terms of defensible reasoning. Consider the process of discourse interpretation as one of KB extension. The K8 contains an utterance-interpretation, and a set of knowledge resources; the latter may include general knowledge of the world, knowledge of linguistic facts, knowledge about tire discourse so far, and about the speaker's knowledge state. We then try to extend the KB so as to include the discourse interpretation. Consider now the process of generation; it too can be thought of as KB extension. Tills time, the KB contains a temporal-causal structure, and a set of knowledge resources, perhaps identical to that used in interpretation. We now try to extend the KB so as to include the realization of a linguistic structure's semantic features (with predicates, arguments, connectives, orderings), where these features ensure that the final linguistic string describes the causal structure in the KB. This view might be described as generation by defeasible reasoning.
Modulo more minor differences, these notions are close to the ideas of interpretation as abduction (Hobbs et al [1988] ) and generation as abduction (ltobbs et al [1990:26-28] ), where we take abduction, in the former case for instance, to be a process returning a temporal-causal structure which can explain the utterance in context. Correspondences between a defensible deduction approach and an abductive approach have been established by Konolige [1991] ; he shows that the two are nearly equivalent, tire consistency-based approach being slightly more powerful [1991:15-16] , once closure axioms are added to the background theory. Lascarides & Oberlander [1992b] discuss ill detail how such a generation process produces temporally adequate utterances.
Interactive defaults
Here, we turn to another, less powerful but simpler, method of applying defensible reasoning: the Interactive Defaults (ID) strategy introduced by Joshi, Webber and Weischedel [1984a , 1984b , 1986 . Rather than considering the defeasible process a.s applying directly to the KS's causal network, we instead consider its role as constraining or debugging candidate linearised utterances, generated by some otimr process; here we will remain neutral on the nature of that originating process.
A speaker S and a hearer H interact through a dialogue; a writer S and a reader tl interact through a text. Joshi et al argue that it is inevitable that both S and H infer more from utterances than is explicitly contained within them. Taking Griee's [1975] Maxim of Quality seriously, they argue that since both .5' and H know this is going to happen, it is incumbent upon S to take into account the implicatures II is likely to make on the basis of a candidate utterance. If S detects that something S believes to be false will be among H's implicatures, S must block that inference somehow. The basic way to block it is for S to use ACRES DE COLING-92, NANrF~, 23-28 AotYr 1992a different utterance; one which S does not believe will mislead H.
In terms of defeasible reasoning, the point is that S must use it to calculate the consequences of the candidate utterance; if the process allows the derivation of something S believes to be false, the utterance should not be used in its current form. Joshi et al illustrate with tile following example; given the KB in (5), and the question in (6), they want the process to show why the answer in (7b) is preferred to that in (7a): (5) Sam is an associate professor; most associate professors are tenured; Sam is not tenured.
(6) ls Sam an associate professor?
(7) a. Yes. b. Yes, but he is not tenured.
We wish to elaborate this interactive defaults strategy 0D), and consider in greater formal detail the defeasible reasoning al)out causal-temporal strnctures that S and H are assumed by S to indulge itl; and to consider which candidate utterances arc eliminated on this basis.
Discourse Structure and Temporal Constraints ID requires a theory of implicatnrc in terms of defaults, and an underlying logical notion of nonrnonotonic or defensible inference. We also require a formal eharacterisation of the properties an adequate candidate utterance must possess; we define these below in terms of temporal coherence, reliability and precision. Fnrthermore, we assume a model of discourse structure is required. For certain discourse relations, such as Narration and Explanation, are implicated from candidate utterances (cf. texts (1) and (2)), and these impose certain temporal relations on tile events described. We turn to this latter issue first.
Discourse

Structure and Inference
The basic model in which we embed ID assumes that candidate discourses possess hierarchical structure, with units linked by discourse relations modelled after those proposed by Hobbs [1985] . Lascarides & Asher [1991] use Narration, Explanation, llaekground, Result and Elaboration. They provide a logical theory for determining the discourse relations between sentences in a text, and the temporal relations between the events they describe. The logic used is the nonmonotonic logic Common Sense Entailment (CE) proposed by Asher & Morreau [1991] . Implieatures are calculated via default rules. For example, they motivate the following rules as manifestations of Gricean-style pragmatic maxims and world knowledge, where the clauses a and/3 appear in that order in the text. Informally:
• Narration
If clauses ~ and/3 are discourse-related, then normally Narration(c~,/~) holds.
• Axiom on Narration
If Narration(c~,/3) holds, and c~ and /3 describe events e 1 and e7 respectively, then el occurs before e2.
* Explanation
If claus~ ~ and fl are discourse-related, and tile event described in fl caused that described in ¢v, then normally Ezplanalion (e~,[t) holds.
* Axiom on Explanatloxt
If Ezplanation (c~,[t) holds, then event el described by c~ does not occur bcfore event e2 described by/3.
• Causal Law
If clauses c~ and fl are discourse-related, and (~ describes the event c I of x fidling and fl the event e2 of y pushing x, then normally c2 causes el.
• Causes Precede Effects
If event e~ eanses el~ t]lell c I doesn't occur bcfore e2.
The rules for Narration and l"xplanation constitute defe~iblc tingnistic knowledge, and the Axioms on them, indefeasible linguistic knowledge. Thc Causal Law is a mixture defea-sible linguistic knowledge and worhl knowledge: given that tim clauses are diseourse-rclated somehow, the events they describe must he commetcd in a causal, part/wholc or overlap relation; here, given the events in question, they must staud illa causal relation~ if things are norreal. That Causes Precede the.it Etfcets is in(lethtmible world knowledge. These rules arc used under the cE inference regime to infer the discourse structures ofcandidate texts. Two i)atterns of inference are particularly relevant: Defensible Modus Ponens (birds normally fly, Twecty is a bird; sn Tweety flies); and the Penguin Principle (all penguins are birds, birds normally fly, penguius normally don't fly, q'weety is a penguin; so Tweety doesn't fly). For example, in thc absence of information to the contrary, the only one of the rules whose antecedent is satisfied in interpreting text (8) is Narration. The consequents of these default laws cannot both hold in a consistent Ks. By the Penguin Principle, the law with the more specific antecedent wins: the Causal Law, because its antecedent logically entails that of Narration. ][lence, (9) is interpreted a.s a ca.se where the pushing caused the falling. In turn, this entails that the antecedent to Explanation is verified; and whilst conflicting with Narration, it's more specific, and hence its consequent--Ezplanation-- the adequacy of an utterauce--iu terms of a set C of relations between eventualities. This set intuitively describes when two eventualities are connected. The relations ill C are: causation, the part/whole relation, 2 temporal overlap, and the immediately precedes relation (where 'et immediately precedes e2 ' means that el and e 2 stand ill a causal or part/whole relation that is compatible with el tcm porally preceding e2). s The definitions are:
• Temporal Coherence A text is temporally coherent if the reader can infer that at least one of tile relations in C holds between the eventualities described m tile sentences.
• Temporal Reliability
A text is temporally reliable if one of the rclations in C which the reader infers to hold does in fact hold between tile eventualities described in the sentences.
• Temporal Precision
A text is temporally precise if whenever the reader infers that one of a proper subset of the relations in C holds between the eventualities described in the sentences, then she is also able to infer which. A text is temporally incoherent if the natural interpretation of the text is such that there are no inferrable relations between the events. A text is temporally unreliable if tim natural interpretation of the text is such that the inferred relations between tile events differ from their actual relations in the world. In addition, a text is temporally imprecise, or as we shall say, ambiguous, if the natural interpretation of tile text is such that the reader knows that one of a proper subset of relations in C holds between the eventualities, but the reader can't infer which of this proper subset holds.
It follows from the above definitions that a text call be coherent but unreliable. On the other hand, there may be no questiou about reliability simply because we cannot establish a temporal or causal relation between the two eventualities. At any rate, a generated utterance is adequate only if it is temporally coherent, reliable and precise. We intend to apply tile ID strategy to eliminate candidate utterances that are inadequate in this sense.
interpretations, and those of (3) versus (4), are given in Lascarides & Asher [1991] . Note that although double applications of the Penguin Principle, as in (9), are not valid in genera], they show that for the particular case considered here, o~ validates the double application. 
p, p ¢ 13+(H) and p q B-(II)). Suppcme that S's
goal is to convey the content of a proposition corn tained in his KB, say q. Suppose also that a WFF p is relevant to generating a particular utterance describing q. Then there are several possible relations
between B(S), B+(H) and B-(H) that concern p:
• Case 1 S knows p and also knows that H does not:
p C B(S) and p ~_ B-(H)
• Case 2 S knows p and isn't sure whether H does or not:
p e 13(S) and p q B+(H) and p q B-(H)
• Case 3 H potentially knows more about p than S does:
p f[ B(S) and p ¢. B+(H) and p f[ 11-(II)
• Case 4 S thinks H is mistaken in believing p:
p ff 11(S) and p e B+(H)
Of course, the cases where both S and H both believe
p (p E B(S) and p e B+(II)) and where neither do (p q B(S) and p C B-(H)) are unproblematic,
and so glossed over here. We look at each of the above cases in turn, considering tile extent to which tile definitions of reliability, coherence and precision hell) us eonstraiu the utterance space (or alternately, debug candidate utterances).
Case 1: ~' ¢ knows more about p than H We now examine the problems concerning reliability that arise when p E B(S) and p E B-(H). There are two possibilities: either p represents defeasible knowledge of tile lmlguage or the world, or p is some fact in the Km We investigate these in turn.
p is defeaslble knowledge Let p be a dcfeasible law that represents knowledge that S has and which S knows H lacks. ~lb illustrate, take the case where p is the causal preference introduced earlier:
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• Causal Law If the clauses ,~ and fl are discourse related, anti c~ and /7 describe respectively the events el of x falling aud e2 of y pushing x, then normally e~ caused e I • Consider the ca.qc where S intends to convey the proposition that John's pushing Max caused the latter to fall. Suppose S has a KB which will allow her to generate the description in (9), among others.
(9) Max fell. John pushed llim.
We have argued that this text is coherent, precise and reliable for S because tile causal law (about the usual causal relation between pushings and failings) is more specific than the linguistic ride (Narration).
But since H lacks the causal law, (9) will trigger a different inference pattern in H; one in which Narration wins after all. S must block this pattern by changing the utterance; she has eascntially two options. If clause order is kept fixed, then ,5' could shift, tense into the pluperfect im in (10); or else S can insert a clue word, such as because, into tile surface form, to generate (11): (10) Max fell. John ]lad pushed him.
(11) Max fell because John pushed him.
The success of tile latter tactic requires ,'5' and H to nmtually know a new linguistic rule, more specific ttlan Narralion, such as the following: 4
• Non-evldential ~Becaus& If c~ and/3 are discourse-related, and the text segment is (r because fl, then normally tile ewmt lie scribed in ~ caused that described in/7.
On tile otimr hand, if clause order is not taken to be fixed, then 5' can simply reorder (9):
(12) John pushed Max. Max fell.
So, when 5" bclicves H lacks the relevant causal law, 5" can simply reorder, and let Na~'atiou do the rest. However, recalling the above discussion, in some cases a discourse structure that invokes Explanation is better than one that invokes Narration. So simply reordering events and letting the rule for Narration achieve tile correct inferences won't work successfidly in all cases. Furthermore, recaning tile iliscussion about states and causation above, it becomes appar. ent that this tactic of always letting Narration do tile work will lead to problenls with texts like (3) and (4).
(3) Max opened the dnor. The roonl was pitcll (lark.
q'lle reason is that, in the absence of the causal law which relates light switching to darkness, (4) will be analysed exactly as (3), giving the wrong result. A solution would be to replace the state expression with all event expression:
(4/) Max switched off the light. The room wen~ pitch dark.
4This is a pragmatic, rather than semantic rule; it's not obvious tll~t this is tile best choice of representation.
An obviolts alternative is to introduce further clue words, and appropriate linguistic rules for reasoning about them. This means exploiting linguistic knowledge to overemne tile gaps in H's world knowledge. This tlelps explain tile observation that texts which (lescribc events ill reverse to temporal order, without marking the reverse, may bc quite rare. It's easy enough 1o interpret such texts, when we have the all: l>ropriate WK. lhlt if a considerate speaker or writer ha~ reason to believe that some or all of her audience lacks that WK, then she will either avoid such descriptive reversals, or mark them with thc type of clues we have discussed.
p is a fact in the Krl We now turn to the case where p is a fact about tim Kn which S knows and which S knows H lacks. Suppose that p asserts a causal relation between two events (lilt does not represent an excelltion to any (lefi;p~qible causal preferences, and that S wishes to convey tile information that p. Then S can simply state p by exploiting H's available LK. Clue words may not be needed. For example, if p is ttle fact that Max stood up and ttlen John greeted him, S can tell H ttlis by uttering (8); Na*~'alion will make (8) reliable and precise for L/.
(8) Max stood Ul). John greeted him.
Similarly, if p is tile fact that Max opened tile door, and wtlile this was going on tile room was pitch dark, then (3) is reliable and precise for 11 : But what if p asserts a causal relation between two events that violates a dcfe~mible causal preference that H has? Snppose p asserts that Max's fall iumlediately preceded aolln's puslling hinl. And suppose that S knows that H has tile defeasible causal law mel~tioned above, but lacks p. Then neitller (9) nor (12) are reliable for //, indicating that S cannot generate all atomic text, to assert p. tf wouhl interpret (9) a~ an explanation; and (12) as a narrative, for nothing will eontliet with Narra-(inn in that case: tile causal preference for pushings causing failings would simply reinforce the temporal structure imposed by Narration. The obvious option is to nlove from (9) to 113); anotber option is to recruit tile pluperfi:et, ms ill 114); note that 115) is not a sohttion, since so can be read evidentially. The seed it) utter (13) rather tllan (9) explains why it c~Ltl be necessary to use and then, even tllough th,'~ thll-stop is always available and, by Narration, has the default effect of temporal progression. So, ill general, one might wish to paraphrase Joshi et all if a relation CtUl be defeasibly referred to hohl between two eventualities, and S' wants solnething dilferent, it is essential to mark the desired relation with sometlling strunger. On the other hand, if S assumes that H's knowledge corresponds to BT, then H will interpret (9) in an undesirable way, witt, the falling preceding the pushing; as we said before, Narration would win. Under this model, S isn't sure how H will interpret (9), because S doesn't know if H's knowledge correo sponds to B! or B2. Hence the ambiguity of(9) manifests itself to the generator S, if not to the hearer H, because S doesn't haw. ~ sufficient information about H to predict wbich of the two alternative temporal structures H will infer for (9). This is slightly different to the previous case where S actually knows H lacks the causal law, making (9) unreliable.
"lb avoid uttering unreliable text, S will have to utter something other thmJ (9). Indeed, it may be possible for S not to worry about tim ambiguity of (9) at all, if some 'safe' strategy can bc tbund that would guide S's expansion of H's knowledge in a way that wmdd ensure the generation of reliable text for H. A plausible strategy for S's reasoning about H would he the following: if S isn't sure whether or not H knows p, then assume H doesn't know p. On the face of it this seen~s plausible. But just how safe is it?
We state it in terms of B+(H) and B-(H):
• lfp q B+(H) and p q B-(H), assume p E B-(H)
and generate-and-test under this assumption.
But this won't work in general. If S wants to convey a violation of the causal law p, but H actually believes p, tben the strategy will suggest the use of (9), which will actually be unreliable for H.
In fact, there is no safe strategy, save tim ouc where S considers several alternative expansions of H's knowledge. As a result, ambiguity of text will manifest itself to S in certain cases, because of her partial knowledge of H. This is perhaps somewhat surprising. Nonmonotonic reasoning is designed as a medium for reasoning witb partial kuowledge. And yet here we have shown S cannot maintain textual reliability on the basis of a partial statement of H's KB, even if nonmonotonic inference is exploited. p is a fact about the KB: Ambiguity Suppose that 5' wants to convey the information that Max's fall immediately preceded John pushing ]tim, and suppose S knows that H knows the causal law, but S doesn't know for sure if H knows already that Max fell before John pushed him. Then, for similar reasons as those mentioned earlier, S isn't sure if (9) is reliable or not.
(9) Max fell. John pushed him.
'17o be sure that text is reliable in this case, .q will again have to exploit linguistic knowledge; for exampie, by uttering (13) instead of (9). (16) is unreliable for S. Arguably, it wouldn't be in the set of possible linguistic realisatious, but only if this set is assumed to be characterised by what S finds reliable. But we bare no argument for this assumption, and so we don't make it. consequence supported by CE was used to make precise how utterances are constrainted by m. Crucially, we used Defensible Modus Ponens and the Penguin Principle. The grounds for criticism were the tempo. ral ramifications of the utterance; if it was incoherent for //, unreliable for H or dangerously ambiguous (for 5'), it was bad.
One limitation of the model is that, although it permits reasoning about the knowledge or beliefs of interlocutors, it neglects their goals and intentions to do actions. ID does not deal with the phenomena which motivate the work following Cohen and Perrault [1979] and Allen and Perrault [1980] , (cf. Cohen, Morgan and Pollack [1990] ). In particular, ID does not let S take into account those inferences H will make in attempting to ascribe a plan to S. Hobbs et al [1990:44-45] argue that inferences leading to plan recognition are less significant in interpreting long written texts or monologues, llence, it might be argued that the generation of such discourses need not give H's plan recognition particular weight. Nonetheless, ID is incomplete, to the extent that such inferences inflncncc discourse generation.
Secondly, discourse structure and temporal structure have become somewhat detached. Sometimes, it's only the causal-temporal structure derivable front the candidate that is being criticized. It may there fore be thought that the discourse structure is aa idle wheel as things stand, and should be either eliminated (el. Sibun [1992] ), or bc trusted with a greater share of the work, enriching the discourse with useful clue words (cf. Scott and Souza [1990] ). Our tentative view is timt tire latter view is plausible, and anyway is closer to the idea of generation by defensible reasoning, canvassed early on.
The |D strategy examined here seems to involve a lot of hard work generating simple eamlidates which almost always require debugging. It would be preferable if we could do this work in advance, by defanlt. The alternative is explored in Lascaridcs and Oberlander [1992b] , in which we abduce discourse structures from event structures, mid then interleave deduction and abduction to derive linguistic realisations. But in turning to the more global approach, we should not lose sight of the fact that simple texts are sometimes best. (2) illustrates this point: the rhetorical relations inferred aren't syntactically marked, arid yet the text is more natural than (1), where the relations are marked. As might be expected, there seems to be a trade-off between the naturalness of the output and its computational cost.
